Global debate on democracy is no longer focused only on who holds elections. The deeper question is whether democracy can survive in terms of institutional functioning, checks and balances, civil liberties, freedom of expression and public trust. Read together, the major democracy measurements published in recent years point to a common conclusion: democracy is receding in many parts of the world, while also entering a period of adaptation and contestation.
1) The shared message in the data: decline is becoming structural
Freedom House reports that global freedom declined for the 19th consecutive year; in its latest assessment period, conditions worsened in 60 countries and improved in 34. This suggests a persistent global trend rather than a set of isolated regional crises.
V-Dem Democracy Report 2025 reinforces that picture, framing the current period as “25 Years of Autocratization.”Its findings suggest that democratic erosion in many countries is no longer a temporary deviation, but part of a longer-term political transformation.
The EIU’s Democracy Index 2024 also supports this diagnosis: the global average score fell to 5.17, the lowest since the index began in 2006 (down from 5.23 in 2023). The EIU also reports that only 45% of the world’s populationlives in a democracy of any kind, while 39% lives under authoritarian rule.
2) Why democracy is shrinking: it is not only about elections
Democratic decline today often does not appear as the complete disappearance of elections, but rather as the erosion of democratic substance. Elections may still be held, yet:
- institutions weaken,
- executive power becomes centralized,
- judicial independence erodes,
- media space narrows,
- civil liberties shrink,
- polarization undermines public consensus.
Freedom House emphasizes that security threats, armed conflict and efforts by elected leaders to override institutional checks are key drivers of the current decline.
V-Dem’s multidimensional approach—covering electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian dimensions—helps explain why today’s crisis is more complex than a simple “election/no election” divide.
3) The new form of democratic backsliding: gradual erosion rather than sudden collapse
In many countries, democracy no longer collapses overnight. A more common pattern is:
- polarizing politics,
- distrust in institutions,
- pressure on media and expression,
- weakening of judicial and oversight bodies,
- eventual erosion of electoral competitiveness.
This gradual pathway makes democratic decline harder to detect early, because formal institutions may remain in place while democratic quality deteriorates. V-Dem’s long-term autocratization framing is especially useful in capturing these slow-erosion dynamics.
4) Where is democracy headed? Three possible trajectories
Current data does not point to a single future. Instead, three parallel trends are emerging:
a) “Electoral but low-quality” democracy in some countries
The EIU’s low global average and the scale of hybrid regimes suggest that many countries may continue to hold elections while democratic quality and freedoms weaken. In this trajectory, democracy does not disappear, but becomes more fragile, lower-standard and easier to manipulate.
b) Open autocratization in some cases
V-Dem’s findings indicate that in a number of countries, democratic institutions are being systematically rolled back. In this path, democracy is not merely weakened—it may be replaced by more durable authoritarian architectures.
c) Institutional resilience and recovery in others
Freedom House data also shows that decline is not universal in every case; some countries improve (34 in the latest report). This suggests democratic backsliding is not inevitable and can be reversed through public demand, institutional resilience, external pressure and political change.
5) The new center of the democracy debate: trust, institutions and the digital sphere
The future of democracy now depends not only on electoral integrity, but also on:
- the quality of the information ecosystem,
- capacity to counter disinformation,
- resilience of independent institutions,
- vulnerability of digital platforms to manipulation,
- citizens’ trust and willingness to participate.
V-Dem’s multidimensional model and Freedom House’s emphasis on civil liberties both indicate that the future of democracy will be shaped less by formal elections alone and more by everyday freedoms and institutional performance.
6) Is there hope?
Yes—but not automatically. The data points to deterioration, but democracies can still recover through strong social demand, local institutional resistance and international solidarity. The key is to defend democracy beyond election day:
- freedom of expression,
- civic space,
- local participation,
- judicial independence,
- transparency,
- accountability.
The future of democracy will depend on whether these pillars can be protected together.
Conclusion: democracy is not ending, but it is changing form
Global data clearly shows that democracy is under serious pressure. But rather than signaling “the end of democracy,” the evidence points to a new phase of struggle over democratic quality. The central question in the coming years will be whether countries become trapped in low-quality electoral regimes, or generate new waves of democratic renewal that strengthen institutions and freedoms.
The data is strong enough to justify concern—but also strong enough to serve as an early warning system and a foundation for rebuilding. Where democracy is headed will depend, in part, on how societies read these signals and what civic and political responses they produce.
